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I. Introduction 
 
Since the end of the last century, the process of globalization has been increasing, markets have 
started to open, and gradually a greater and faster trade between companies in different countries 
has been promoted.1 This has influenced for many trade barriers to be removed and caused trade 
liberalization to emerge. Within this context, many States have found themselves getting involved into 
all types of commercial agreements, including free trade agreements. 2  
But globalization has also had adverse effects, specifically social, on an essential part of 
commerce, which is labour. Many trade agreements have placed greater emphasis on the rights of 
companies and have neglected workers rights. International norms have been created with the 
purpose of protecting companies and investments, but labour rights have been left as the 
responsibility of national legislations.3  
Given that national law is not enough to protect labour rights when international trade is involved, 
in recent years, labour standards have been progressively integrated into trade agreements ‘as part 
of trying to ensure that trade liberalization upholds or improves labour standards, rather than puts 
them at risk’.4 
One of the most relevant recent free trade agreements is the one between the United States, 
Mexico, and Canada, the three countries that compose the North American continent. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) through its parallel accord, the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) was the first explicit incorporation of labour rights in a free trade 
agreement.  
Currently, a process of renewal and updating is taking place with respect to NAFTA, with a new 
agreement, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). USMCA is waiting to be ratified 
by the United States and Canada, given that Mexico has already ratified the treaty. 
                                                        
1 Marlon M. Meza-Salas, ‘Aspectos Laborales en los Tratados de Libre Comercio y Acuerdos de 
Integracion Regional: Entre Normas Internacionales del Trabajo y Clausulas Sociales en el 
Derecho Estatal, Inter-Estatal y Transnacional. Del NAFTA al TPP’, (2017) 24 Miami International 
and Comparative Law Review 661, 665. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Marlon M. Meza-Salas (n 1) 673. 
4 ILO, ‘Studies on Growth with Equity – Social Dimensions of Free Trade Agreements’ (2013). 
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Regardless of the status of ratification of USMCA, the main focus of this investigation will be 
NAFTA, an analysis of it and how it should improve, and if the new agreement will follow these 
recommended changes. It should be taken into consideration that at the moment of this analysis there 
is a duality: NAFTA is currently in force, but USMCA has been ratified by one of the parties, and 
consequently, already has taken effect to such an extent that its repercussions can be analysed from 
the perspective of Mexican labour law. It should be noted that by the time a definite answer about the 
commercial relationship between these three States is announced, several scenarios should be in 
play. Either the United States and Canada do not ratify and USMCA is not enforced, USMCA gets 
ratified by the three parties and therefore replaces NAFTA completely, or, finally, no agreement is 
reached and the negotiations reach a state of limbo in which USMCA is not enforced but NAFTA is 
no longer active. If this last scenario were to happen, the commercial relations between the three 
North American countries would be at a crossroads. Given all of this, for the purpose of this research, 
both agreements will be analysed in parallel. NAFTA will not be discarded completely because it is 
what currently governs the commercial relation between these States, and neither will the USMCA 
since it might become the acting ruling treaty.  
Since the purpose of this study is to evaluate the influence NAFTA has had on Mexican labour 
law, it will be an evaluation of one of the indirect effects of NAFTA. So, given that NAFTA’s effects in 
this area (labour) are indirect, and because the data is inconclusive since NAFTA is still in force, 
conclusions are made with consideration and caution.5 The analysis is independent of the possible 
outcomes that might come to happen, it will be geared towards the substance of both agreements. 
The structure of the study will be as follows: Chapter 2 focuses on globalization, commercial 
agreements and the neglecting of the labour rights within these agreements, emphasizing on what is 
the base that international treaties should have with regards to labour rights, and the necessity of 
having a social dimension. Chapter 3 touches the topic of the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
the role it has as it is the main global organism that deals with labour rights, and its control 
mechanisms, their effectiveness, and how this impacts the need to have a social clause in free trade 
                                                        
5 Ranko Shiraki Oliver, 'In the Twelve Years of NAFTA, the Treaty Gave to Me..What, Exactly: An 
Assessment of Economic, Social, and Political Developments in Mexico since 1994 and Their 
Impact on Mexican Immigration into the United States' (2007) 10 Harvard Latino Law Review 53. 
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agreements. Chapter 4 deals with the behaviour of commercial agreements with labour law and 
labour standards. NAFTA and NAALC are discussed in this chapter. Chapter 5 will talk about the 
influence of NAFTA on Mexican labour law before, during, and after NAFTA. An analysis of NAALC’s 
influence will be provided in this chapter as well. Chapter 6 discussed the new North American trade 
agreement, its description, the impact it has had on Mexican labour law, a comparison between 
NAFTA and USMCA, and an analysis of whether the USMCA is a step back or forward from NAFTA. 
Finally, Chapter 7 will present the concluding thoughts. 
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II. Globalization and commercial agreements: Free Trade 
Agreements and Regional Trade Agreements 
 
We often hear the term ‘globalization’ as one of the main influences in our political, economic 
and social life, therefore making an impact in law and industrial relations. According to Harry Arthurs, 
it has a different connotation. He establishes that when making reference to the term, you could be 
talking about an integrated system of business arrangements across international borders that 
focuses on the movement of a vast quantity of goods, services, information and capital between 
international borders, ‘with low friction and high velocity’. But it can also be considered as a 
technological, political (often referred to neo-liberalism) and/or legal system.6  
From the 1980's onwards, the globalization process has been accelerating due to great 
changes in the world as well as technological development. 7  As mentioned by Anam Ullah, 
globalization has had such an impact that the ‘dominant nation state-based economic model’ has 
begun to crumble due to its effect and advances.8 Markets have been opened, and gradually a greater 
and faster trade between companies in different countries has been promoted. As a consequence of 
this and the expansion of large multinational companies, an environment of greater competitiveness 
has been generated. This puts pressure on less advanced or localized companies in less developed 
countries to try to catch up with these large companies, subjecting themselves many times to 're-
industrialization' processes as described by Marlon Meza-Salas.9 The ‘re-industrialization’ process 
requires for companies to adapt to modern production processes and reorganize their production 
structure, including retraining their workforce.10 This is considering that, in the end, the objective is to 
produce goods or offer services at the lowest possible cost to be considered competitive. In Anam 
                                                        
6 Harry Arthurs, 'Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lecture' 
(2001) 22 Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law 271, 274. 
7 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy - Challenges for 
the World Trade Organization’ (1999) 1999 Human Rights in Development Yearbook 51, 53. 
8 Anam Ullah, ‘Garment Industry in Bangladesh: An Era of Globalization and Neo –Liberalization’ 
(2015) 10 Middle East Journal of Business 14, 15. 
9 Marlon M. Meza-Salas (n 1) 665. 
10 Ibid. 
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Ullah (2015) it was cited that globalization drives large companies to seek great performance at a low 
cost.11 
Alongside these effects of globalization, many trade barriers have also been removed and 
trade liberalization has emerged.12 It is within this context that many States have been pushed to sign 
and get involved into all types of commercial agreements, bilateral and multilateral, to make 
international commerce easier.13Despite the fact that transnational investment and technology are 
considered crucial for globalization, free trade agreements are the ones that represent ‘the terms 
under which globalization is to be accomplished’.14 
The responsible body for certain of the aforementioned international commercial agreements 
is the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose main purpose is to regulate trade barriers and ‘help 
liberalize trade’. The WTO does this by providing a forum for the negotiation of binding trade 
agreements and settling any disputes, as well as providing the necessary mechanisms to help enforce 
the previous mentioned agreements.15 As established before, globalization’s main impact has been 
the construction of commercial blocs within nations. As part of the WTO, a classification of different 
commercial agreements exists, but for the purpose of this study, the focus will be on Preferential 
Trade Agreements.  
The WTO establishes, as one of its principles, the Most-Favourable Nation (MFN) clause, 
which means that in agreements submitted under the WTO, normally, there should be no 
discrimination between trading partners. If a States is granted a special favour, the rest of the WTO 
members should be treated the same.16 When it comes to the MFN clause, the WTO permits some 
exceptions. For example, Members can create a free trade agreement, in which case there is 
discrimination to products that come from the outside given that the free trade is in relation to the 
                                                        
11 Anam Ullah (n 8) 15. 
12 Marlon M. Meza-Salas (n 1). 
13 Ibid 666.  
14 Ranko Shiraki Oliver (n 5). 
15 ‘What is the World Trade Organization?’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm>. 
16 WTO, ‘Principles of the trading system’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm>. 
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goods that are traded within the group.17 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) are also an exception 
to the MFN principles, by which all WTO Members are committed to impose on the same non-
discriminatory tariff one another. 18 It is important to differentiate the two Preferential Trade 
Agreements: Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and Customs Unions (CUs). FTAs have free trade between 
the members. In addition to having the same things as the FTAs, Customs Unions (CUs) have a 
‘common external tariff or, strictly, common trade policy toward excluded countries’.19 
However, in the last decades, due to globalization and the ongoing evolution the WTO, 
international trade and investment law have gone through, a new aspect impacting them has become 
paramount in their respective trade agendas: human rights. The WTO has had more international 
pressure to incorporate human rights into its agenda, including into its PTA’s. 
 Even though human rights violations have been an issue in the global agenda way before 
this period of rapid economic integration, ‘the growing number of sectors covered by multilateral trade 
and investment agreements’ have caused new human rights abuses that have not been properly 
addressed.20 Although it may seem as international trade and human rights are unrelated, the reality 
is different. Given that, during the last decades, awareness towards globalization arose, concern 
regarding the need for 'fair trade' and social justice at an international commercial level also began to 
emerge. This brought up as a consequence the necessity to deal with the 'social dimension' of 
international trade.21 
 
a. Necessity of having a social dimension 
 
The rise of free trade and universal human rights regimes comes as an aftermath of war. Yet, 
these two phenomena have developed ‘on parallel, separate, and sometimes inconsistent tracks’.22 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
18 WTO, ‘The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence’ (2011) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr11-2a_e.pdf>. 
19 L. Alan Winters, ‘Preferential Trade Agreements: Friend or Foe?’ in Kyle W. Bagwell and Petros C. 
Mavroidis (eds), Preferential Trade Agreements: A Law and Economics Analysis (Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 11. 
20 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua (n 7). 
21 Marlon M. Meza-Salas (n 1). 
22 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua (n 7). 
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The French iuslaboralist, Alain Supiot, mentions that 'the elimination of trade frontiers has led to a [...] 
transformation of the forms of work organization on a world scale. [...] The elimination of trade borders 
also affects the balance of forces on which social justice is based.'23 
Current challenges involve how to bring harmony between trade and human rights regimes 
since they need not to be conflicted. After all, with the continuous globalization it is important to 
eliminate human rights violations such as exploitation, exclusion and discrimination. Since, as said 
before, trade is the key factor that drives globalization, it is crucial that at least the rules that govern 
it promote and protect human rights and not oppose them.24 
The International Court of Justice has recognised human rights “not only individual rights but 
also, in case of universally recognised human rights, erga omnes obligations of governments based 
on treaty law and general international law” 25. The problem has not been solely from the WTO and it 
being deficient on the conceptualisation and application on human rights, but similarly, “in most 
worldwide organisations, human rights have not yet been effectively integrated into multilateral 
rulemaking and policies are not effectively protected through worldwide adjudication”, as States also 
find interest in pushing back a humanitarian agenda.26 
It is necessary to 'attack' the adverse effects that globalization has brought and put 
globalization at the service of society and not at the service of specific interests of certain groups with 
economic or political power. Indeed, there have been collateral effects, specifically social, that have 
affected an essential part of commerce, which is labour. Trade agreements, especially free trade 
agreements, have placed greater emphasis on the rights of companies and have treated workers’ 
rights as residual, meaning that they are not always included in FTA’s. That is to say, international 
norms have been created with the purpose of protecting companies and investments, but labour rights 
have been left as the responsibility of national legislations.27 
                                                        
23 Alain Supiot, ‘Conferencia de Apertura del XXI Congreso de la Sociedad Internacional de 
Derecho del Trabajo y la Seguridad Social: ¿Qué Justicia Social Internacional en el Sigo XXI?’ 
(Ciudad del Cabo, 15 september 2015). 
24 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua (n 7) 56. 
25Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutional Economics, Human Rights and the Future of the WTO”, 
Aussenwirtschaft 2003 < https://ideas.repec.org/a/usg/auswrt/2003580147-92.html > 32. 
26 ibid, 33 
27 Marlon M. Meza-Salas (n 1) 673. 
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According to Harry Arthurs, there have been several ways in which globalization has had an 
effect on labour law. First, globalization has changed the world’s perspective towards labour law and 
labour policy. Governments have accepted that better benefits will come to those countries whose 
labour policies are perceived as ‘business friendly’.28 Arthurs describes two models that are mainly 
adopted by governments to pursue, that can be seen as welcoming for investors: one whose main 
target is, through economic structural alterations, to reduce ‘wage-driven inflation’ that will decrease 
returns on investment, and the other intends to protect workers’ rights but has difficulties renovating 
labour laws that intend to do so.29 
Second, now there is more competition, internationally, between workers. It is easier for 
employers to decide between producing locally with local workers, abroad with foreign workers or 
seeking outsourcing altogether, thus creating more competition for jobs. This way there is a higher 
temptation for corporations to search for jurisdictions with low labour standards to lower production 
costs.30 The issue is that this competing group of workers contains workers from different sovereign 
nations, which do not form part of a federal union; therefore it is more difficult to have them under the 
same legal labour regime. 
Third, globalization has debilitated the relationship between employees and employers and, 
as a result, weakened the ‘whole notion of community of interest’ between workers. It has become 
more difficult for workers to identify with common adversaries, expectations, and strategies, among 
other things.31 Lastly, even though workers manage to confront the previous difficulties, sometimes 
they have to face systematic difficulties due to inconsistent rules in the labour law system. Even in 
countries and companies that have common or similar legal protections, these systematic difficulties 
are terrible, for example when dealing with companies that operate in different jurisdictions.32 
In summary, globalization has made national law not enough to target and satisfy all the 
needs of the great amount of labour activities, weakening ‘the political legitimacy and practical effect 
                                                        
28 Harry Arthurs (n 6) 281. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Harry Arthurs (n 6) 282. 
31 Bob Hepple, 'A Race to the Top - International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of 
Conduct' (1999) 20 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 347, 351. 
32 Harry Arthurs (n 6) 283. 
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of national labour law’. With this, it has frustrated the development of new labour law systems that 
would answer the needs of transnational economic activity.33 For these reasons it is considered a 
necessity to deal with the social dimension of international trade, especially in free trade agreements, 
to set a basis for national labour law. 
 
b. Minimum base for trade agreements  
 
The WTO has some standard set of obligations that are adopted by its members that do not 
allow them to take any discriminatory approach and treatment of products between each other’s 
markets. 34  Yet, as previously mentioned, there are some provisions that are exceptions to this 
general rule, such as the Most Favourable Nation and National Treatment clauses.35 Moreover, it is 
forbidden for members to ‘impose restrictions, other than those permitted under GATT, on imports or 
exports’.36 Still, the text of the GATT does not explicitly mention human rights as basis to impose 
these restrictions or exclude products. Nonetheless, Article XX sets up exceptions by which it 
authorizes WTO members to take measures against States that violate human rights. In other words 
it promotes and protects them. 37 These special circumstances include, within others, measures to 
protect public morals, human, animal, plant life or health as well as measures relating to the products 
of prison labour, and the implementation of any of these will not constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination […] or a disguised restriction on international trade’.38 
Although these measures allow States to substantiate their arguments, in certain cases, 
under human rights violations, it does not mean that all universal rights are included; it is something 
that needs to be established directly in each FTA. International treaties and conventions have a direct 
judicial effect solely on the States that are part of it, that sign it.39  
                                                        
33 Ibid 284.  
34 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua (n 7) 66. 
35 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, Art. I (1) and Art. III. 
36 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua (n 7) 66. 
37 GATT (n 35), Art. XX. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Harry Arthurs (n 6) 286. 
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Regarding international labour rights, there is conflict on whether those States that do not 
comply with ‘core labour standards’ should remain as WTO members. The issue is, ironically, that 
some of these members that seek to remain as part of the WTO have not ratified the International 
Labour Organization’s compendium of Conventions that are the basis or are where ‘core labour 
standards’ are taken from.40  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is a tripartite organization formed by trade 
unions, governments and companies, and part of the United Nations. Since 1919, the ILO ‘has 
maintained and developed a system of core labour standards’ to promote opportunities for women 
and men to obtain a decent work, in an environment of ‘freedom, equity, security and dignity’. This, 
following that in the current globalized economy, international labour standards are a key component 
in the international arena to ensure that the growth of the global economy brings with it positive 
consequences for all.41  
The ILO, in 1998, adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
(ILO’s Declaration). It entrust Members to ‘respect and promote principles and rights in four 
categories, whether or not they have ratified the relevant Convention’.42 These core labour standards 
categories are laid out in eight different Conventions: freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining (Conventions 87 and 98), prohibition of forms of forced 
and compulsory labour (Conventions 29 and 105), abolition of child labour or the establishment of 
minimum age of employment (Convention 138 and 182), and equal remuneration and elimination of 
discrimination respect employment (Conventions 100 and 111).43 
The above are considered the core labour standards that every government, company and 
trade union should look for, respect and fight for. Therefore, these are considered to be the minimum 
base that trade agreements should include, given that they are already included and accepted within 
the WTO. 
                                                        
40 Ibid.  
41 ILO, ‘Introduction to International Labour Standards’, 
<https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/lang--
en/index.htm>. 
42 ILO, ‘ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’, 
<https://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm>. 
43 ‘ILO Declaration…’ (n 42); see also Harry Arthurs (n 6) 286. 
 15 
 
c. States’ Sovereignty conflict 
 
The principle of national sovereignty states that every individual State is free and has the right 
to ‘enact and enforce’ its own laws without the intervention of any foreign nation.44 Usually, there are 
two types of sovereignty recognized: internal and external. The internal points out that each State 
has the main power within its borders, meaning there is no higher authority that can perform any 
action inside its limits. Externally, each State is considered as equal to other States, despite their 
differences. Both types relate because none of them allow intervention, it is their ‘guiding principle’.45 
Nowadays there are numerous treaties and institutions regarding universal and regional 
human rights. Without differentiating between those whose mandate is simply to monitor, promote 
compliance or enforce human rights, this set of norms and institutions has drastically changed the 
previously held international concept of state sovereignty, which came to grant the States the impunity 
regarding internal misconduct.46 
In international law, the term sovereignty has been transformed. Within Kurt Mills’ research 
(1997) he cited a publication of W. Michael Reisman. He identified that although the term is in use in 
international legal practices, in modern international law it means something different. Although 
international law still defends sovereignty, its main concern and prime thing to defend is the ‘people’s 
sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s sovereignty’.47 So, there has been a reconceptualization of 
the term were States are now incorporating human rights and are, as well, willing to respond to protect 
these rights within a global framework.48 
Human rights do not negate nor should threaten States’ sovereignty, but they do limit 
sovereignty in important aspects. National law is not replaced by international law, instead, 
                                                        
44 Harry Arthurs (n 6) 283. 
45 Kurt Mills, 'Reconstructing Sovereignty: A Human Rights Perspective' (1997) 15 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 267, 268. 
46 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua (n 7) 57. 
47 Kurt Mills (n 45) 278. 
48 Ibid. 
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international law guides sovereign States over the internationally accepted human rights. Yet, in many 
cases it is up to the States to implement the aforementioned norms into their domestic law.49 
As established in several constitutions and political processes, the will of the people is 
guaranteed by sovereignty, which eventually leads to the creation of national law. However, this 
principle interferes with the harmonization of different States’ labour laws, in other words with the 
creation of an international or trans-border labour law.50 
There is currently a process of internationalization of labour rights promoted by States, 
international organizations and multinational companies through minimum rights. There has been a 
need to address the 'social dimension' of international trade by giving this dimension to free trade 
agreements and trade integration agreements.51 When dealing with these issues, one enters into the 
conflict of States’ sovereignty (with the exception of the European Union that does have labour rights 
for the community). There is a difficulty in harmonizing the substantive labour law between 
countries. 52  When States are faced with a problem involving different national jurisdictions, 
sovereignty heightens that conflict; it is a source of the systematic difficulties previously mentioned.53  
Mills concludes that ‘the State as a sovereign entity is not going to disappear anytime soon.’ 
Nevertheless, there are a number of different types of sovereignties that are moving the world.54 The 
State has stopped to be the sole entity that claims authorities over citizens, citizens and humans in 
general have power towards the State too. The human rights issue will continue to raise questions 
regarding to what extent can international organizations or other States intervene? 
III. Need for a Social Clause in Trade Agreements 
a. ILO’s Role 
 
                                                        
49 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua (n 7) 57. 
50 Morley Gunderson, ‘Harmonization of Labour Policies Under Trade Liberalization’, (1998) 53 
Industrial Relations 24, 35. 
51 Marlon M. Meza-Salas (n 1). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Harry Arthurs (n 6) 283. 
54 Kurt Mills (n 45) 289. 
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Placing responsibility and protection of workers’ rights has had its resistance within some 
countries as well as within the WTO framework. The organism responsible for developing agreements 
regarding labour rights concerns is the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO has 
promulgated over 177 conventions on labour standards that address general labour rights issues as 
well as ‘detailed standards in particular industries’.55 Founded in 1919, ILO is the only tripartite U.N. 
agency which aims to bring together the three factors of labour relations: government, employers and 
workers of the 187 member States. The purpose of bringing them together is to ‘set labour standards, 
develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men’.56 
The ILO achieves its goal through three main bodies where governments', employers' and 
workers' representatives are part of: (i) the International labour Conference which is ‘often called an 
international parliament of labour’ given that it is responsible of setting the international labour 
standards and policies, and also is a forum for discussion of key questions; (ii) the Governing body, 
which is the executive council that establishes ILO policy, programme and budget, for later 
submission to the Conference; and (iii) the International Labour Office ‘is the permanent secretariat’, 
it is the focal point for the general activities of ILO.57 
The ILO’s most important assignment is to develop, promote and monitor international labour 
standards. Currently, they have created 189 Conventions that are legally binding and globally 
applicable, as well as 206 non-binding Recommendations with the aim to regulate labour conditions.58  
Representatives of governments, employers and workers, formulate Conventions and 
Recommendations, and once they are considered possible International Labour Standards, they are 
adopted at the ILO Conference. 59  For the purpose of this paper, the focus will be mostly on 
Conventions, which are those that would have mandatory application when the following conditions 
                                                        
55 Robert Howse and Makau Mutua (n 7) 68. 
56 ILO, ‘About the ILO’, < https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 16 
August 2019. 
57 ILO, ‘How the ILO works’, < https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--
en/index.htm> accessed 16 August 2019. 
58 Werner Sengenberger, ‘The International Labour Organization: Goals, Functions and Political 
Impact’ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 9. 
59 ILO, ‘Conventions and Recommendations’, <https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-
international-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 
16 August 2019. 
 18 
are also met: (i) it has been ratified by the country in question; (ii) that such ratification has been 
deposited with the International Labour Office, and 12 months have elapsed since the deposit; and 
(iii) that the Convention has entered into force.60 
Sergio López Bohle and Sebastián Ugarte Gómez’s research describes the ‘three stages in 
developing labour regulation’ applicable to ILO.61 First, ILO has to develop and promote universal 
labour standards with the objective of ensuring that appropriate work is created, and with it, economic 
growth and development. It is difficult to achieve consensus from all Member States, yet the majority 
of them have ratified most of the core labour standards (CLS). Second, the ILO monitors compliance 
of the standards ‘by developing reports, supervising and securing conformity of their application with 
the ILO’s committees.’62 The last role of ILO is, when there is lack of compliance of the standards, to 
apply sanctions and remedies. According to the research, this is the ‘most polemic step’ since there 
is no general agreement on the nature of the sanctions that are to be applied.63  
 
b. ILO’s Supervisory Mechanisms 
 
International labour standards are supported by a supervisory system or mechanism, which 
is considered unique on an international level.64 This system helps promote and verify the application 
of the Conventions and Recommendations, following their adoption by the International Labour 
Conference and ratification of Member States.65 If there are any problems in the application of 
standards by Member States, the ILO attempts social dialogue and technical assistance.66  
There are two kinds of supervisory mechanisms. The first called ‘Regular system of 
supervision’ and ‘Special procedures’. The first, also called periodic or routine supervision,67 consists 
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of reports that are made on ratified conventions, non-ratified conventions and recommendations (on 
compliance with the obligation to submit to the competent national authorities and the difficulties that 
prevent or delay the ratification of certain Conventions), which the ILO requests ex officio their 
member states and the latter respond using forms.68  
The regular system of supervision is based on the examination by two ILO bodies, the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, and the 
International Labour Conference’s Tripartite Committee on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations.69 The role of the first is to ‘provide an impartial and technical evaluation of the 
application of international labour standards in ILO Member States’.70 This evaluation is of the report 
provided by governments every three years on the measures they have taken regarding their national 
law and practice to implement any of the eight fundamental and four governance Conventions that 
they have ratified.71 
On the other hand, the Special, unlike the Regular system of supervision, involves the 
submission of a representation or a complaint (in either of the three procedures that exist).72 The 
procedures related to the also called ‘Non-Regular supervision’ may be urged by a Member State or 
derive from the action of third parties against a Member State, and may be Representations, 
Complaints in general or a special procedure for complaints regarding freedom of association (under 
that respective Committee). 73  Representation procedure pursuant to Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Constitution of the ILO, is exercised by an industrial association of workers or employers against a 
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Member State for failure to comply with any Convention ratified by it. Representations are presented 
to the ILO Governing Body.74  
Differently, Complaints in accordance with articles 26 to 34 of the ILO Constitution are 
exercised by one Member State against another, for the lack of compliance with a Convention that 
both have ratified, also can be exercised by a delegate to the International Labour Conference or the 
Governing Body on its own initiative. 75  After the complaint is received, the Body establishes a 
Commission of Inquiry responsible for executing a full investigation, verifying the facts and issuing 
‘recommendations on measures to be taken to address the problems raised by the complaint’.76 It is 
important to note that a Commission of Inquiry is contemplated to be the ‘highest-level investigative 
procedure’ and therefore is set up in very specific occasions such as when a Member State is 
‘accused of committing persistent and serious violations and has repeatedly refused to address 
them’.77 The Governing Body intervenes when a country ignores or fails to fulfil the recommendations 
from the Commission of Inquiry. Article 33 of the ILO Constitution states 
[i]n the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the 
recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, or in the 
decision of the International Court of Justice, as the case may be, the Governing Body 
may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to 
secure compliance therewith.78 
According to the ILO, this Article was enforced for the first time in 2000 in the Myanmar case where 
the Governing Body, in order to end the use of forced labour, asked the International Labour 
Conference to take action towards that country.79 This case will be further addressed in the next 
section. 
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Furthermore, and taking into account the importance of issues related to freedom of 
association, there is a special procedure for Complaints on the violation of freedom of association, of 
which there is a special body called the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), under the 
Governing Body. Like ILO, it is also a tripartite body. The CFA was created in 1951 and its main 
function is "examining complaints of violations of freedom of association, whether or not the country 
concerned had ratified the relevant Conventions"80, which are presented mainly by national and 
international trade union organizations.81 
A common element to all ILO control mechanisms, whether regular or non-regular, is that 
generally they resolve with the issuance of a report or conclusions where the measures that should 
be taken are stated. This can range from setting a later date to examine the matter, or asking the 
government in question for explanations, to transferring the issue for the study of a Commission of 
Inquiry that will end with the submission of a report, among other measures.82 A Commission of 
Inquiry is usually set up when a member State persistently commits serious labour violations to the 
ratified Conventions which are binding for them, and has not addressed them, meaning there is a 
clear reluctance to assume the complaints.83 It is perhaps the highest level of investigation procedure 
in the ILO.84 
In the final report issued by the control body in question, after following the applicable 
procedure, in general, the sanction (if any) ends up being of a moral nature, using excessively 
diplomatic, subtle and excessively polite language.85 This may lead for example, to making a claim 
public or making the response sent by a government public, and in the best case the conclusive 
reports that are issued will contain recommendations addressed to the denounced country’s 
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government, where they are "invited", "requested", or in extreme cases  "urged" to take certain 
measures. 86  
In case of non-compliance there are no sanctions, neither economic nor of any other type, 
since the sanctioning system of the ILO is persuasive or dissuasive, not punitive or repressive. No 
ILO body has a jurisdictional character and therefore it is not possible to enforce its decisions 
coercively.87The aforementioned claims and complaints can only be attempted against States that 
have ratified the Convention that has been violated, except when it concerns complaints about 
violations of freedom of association, which can be known independently that the State has ratified.88 
 
c. Effectiveness of ILO’s Norms and Controls 
 
There have been, however, several critics towards the ILO. First, the broadness and diversity 
of the activities it manages has raised questions regarding the lack of focus on the workers’ essential 
human rights in a globalized economy. Secondly, the Labour Organization requires formal, effective 
mechanisms for dispute settlement and enforcement.89 Analysts claim that given the fact that the 
recommendations mentioned above are not legally binding, it is left at the discretion of the 
governments of Member States to decide to follow them or not, and are left ‘unpunished’ for their 
violations.90 
When evaluating the applicability of ILO’s CLS it is important to consider that these are part 
of a soft law instrument. Therefore, there is criticism towards the ILO for ‘not being more effective in 
re-enforcing the standards’.91 Yet, the CLS are not the only soft law instruments. Other instruments 
are similar such as the U.N. Global Compact, the OECD guidelines for multinational companies and 
codes of conduct.92 
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The authors enlist several elements to consider for the evaluation of the effectiveness of ILO’s 
supervisory mechanisms. Since the majority of Member States have ratified the eight core 
conventions, it is easier to apply the ‘methods of public exposure’ that ILO uses to enforce compliance 
of this ratifications. 93 Given that ILO’s sanctioning system is persuasive or dissuasive, relying on a 
participative decentralized system, they confide on ‘moral suasion’ dialogue, with conciliation and co-
operation as last resource to enforce labour standards.94 Yet, as for the monitoring aspect, there is 
some criticism around the exact definition of CLS, reliable sources of information, and international 
mechanisms to monitor standards. Nevertheless, they estimate the actions and performance of the 
CFA have made major improvements to social justice, particularly in developing countries’ trade 
unionists’ persecutions.95  
In general terms, it is important to distinguish between the effectiveness of possible sanctions 
and incentives, which in both cases the ILO cannot directly impose since they are beyond its direct 
capacity. However, the Organization can take measures to pressure governments.96 
As established before, ILO does not have ‘direct sanctioning powers’, therefore it can only ask 
the respective governments to enforce the Recommendations they give, by ‘making special reference 
to specific clauses in bilateral or regional free trade Agreements (e.g. NAFTA, Mercosur)’ or towards 
programs that were enacted by international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank or even 
the WTO.97 The settlement instruments and recommendations vary from administrative sanctions 
such as fines, to other with major economical repercussions such as trade and/or financial sanctions. 
The aim of these is to discourage the government lacking proper compliance with essential labour 
standards from tolerating and/or supporting labour rights reported abuses.98 
One of the most significant cases was that of Myanmar (Burma). A Commission of Inquiry 
had been assembled to determine whether Myanmar complied with the obligations under Convention 
29. They found that ‘there was “abundant evidence” that the Myanmar authorities made “pervasive 
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use” of forced labour’.99 For that reason, the Commission issued some recommendations that the 
country fail to act upon. Therefore, given that Myanmar failed to act and follow the given 
recommendations, restrictions were applied to the country in 1999 and 2000. The restrictions were 
based on article 33 of ILO’s Constitution and it was the first time in history this article was invoked.100 
The recommendations included Myanmar’s legislation to be modified (particularly the Village and 
Town Acts) to comply with Convention 29 (ratified by the country); stop the imposition of forced labour 
by the authorities (military); and for penalties to be appointed, for the contribution to forced labour, to 
those found responsible after a thorough investigation and prosecution.101 It was not until 2013 that 
the ILO voted to lift all remaining restrictions on Myanmar after analysing the progress the country 
has made. It also tells other ILO members to help by contributing with financial support for elimination 
of forced labour. Likewise, the Conference proposes the Governing Body to examine Myanmar’s 
situation regarding other ILO activities such as ‘the impact of foreign investment on decent working 
conditions in the country’.102 This has been a successful case in which ILO’s recommendations have 
been actually applied and have improved the labour quality of a country.  
On the contrary, there are some who conclude that there is no ‘truly general and acceptable 
conclusion’ with respect to the effectiveness of sanctions given that ILO does not have foreign policy 
instruments, and the impact that the Organization really has is only identifiable case by case.103 
However, the active role ILO has in terms of ‘monitoring and technical assistance’ that promotes 
collaboration between governments and employer organizations is considered as one of the most 
effective conditions that are found in trade agreements to reach improvement of labour conditions.104 
Additionally, and considering everything previously exposed, for López Bohle and Ugarte 
Gómez, ILO’s actions have been good in securing and developing core labour standards, yet they 
                                                        
99 ILO, ‘ILO lifts remaining restrictions on Myanmar’ (June 2013), 
<https://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/previous-sessions/102/media-
centre/news/WCMS_216355/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 16 August 2019. 
100 Ibid. 
101 ILO, ‘ILO Governing Body opens the way for unprecedented action against forced labour in 
Myanmar’ (November 2000), < https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_007918/lang--en/index.htm> accessed 16 August 2019. 
102 ILO, ‘ILO lifts remaining…’ (n 99). 
103 Fabrizio Onida (n 85) 13. 
104 Ibid 14. 
 25 
consider that the system could improve through cooperation of all social actors involved.105They give 
several recommendations in which the system could improve. First, they suggest involving employers 
and social actors more actively, for they can have influence in incorporating CLS into corporate codes 
of conduct. Secondly, address the matters involving international labour principles in national debate, 
for it is more probable to generate change if the public, social stakeholders and media are involved. 
Third, they consider the incorporation of a social clause in trade agreements as extremely important. 
But they recognize that this has been a topic that has aroused discussion, yet they acknowledge 
‘humans and institutions need enforcement through penalties to react upon non-compliant 
behaviours’. Additionally the WTO should take a bigger involvement, including social justice in their 
agreements. Fourth, improve the reach of ILO’s actions and methods regarding new forms of working 
like subcontracting, and finally also increase the coverage of the increasing informal sector 
workers.106 
 
d. A Social Clause 
 
As a result of trade growth, there has been, for several years, a continuing debate as to 
whether or not labour right and international trade should be linked. This interest originated due to 
the existence of certain countries with cheap labour, with low levels of labour protection and social 
security, or with both. The specifics of each country’s development or economic conditions are 
considered to be the cause of this labour rights violations. If these are not considered the originators, 
another probable cause would be the ‘deregulatory and flexible measure’ that were brought up to the 
labour market by many countries with the ‘intention’ of helping local companies confront the 
challenges of globalization or authorize them to be more competitive in that environment.107 
Trade and labour are linked in different ways. There are two main approaches that support 
the linkage argument: human rights-based approach and a competition-based approach. Those who 
are advocates of the competition-based idea make their arguments around unfair competition and a 
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race to the bottom theory.108 It states that countries with lower labour standards have lower production 
costs, and consequently they have a competitive advantage. In this manner, potentially, other 
countries will race to also lower their standards with the purpose of reducing their production costs 
‘allowing them to remain competitive and attract foreign investment’.109 
One of the main reasons core labour standards were established was, according to Christine 
Kaufmann, ‘the fear that low labour standards might reduce the cost of labour and subsequently lead 
to what some scholars call a “race to the bottom”.’110 This view defends that companies favour lower 
protection for labour environments, therefore, if they find it necessary, they change production 
locations abroad where they find lower labour costs.111 
The race to the bottom also promotes what is known as ‘social dumping’, which is an economic 
crime. It involves unfair competition based on exploitation and low wages of workers, to lower 
production costs and offer more competitive prices.112 Harald Grossmann and Georg Koopmann 
provide a general definition of social dumping:  
Unlike conventional dumping which means selling abroad below cost or at lower prices than 
charged in the home market, 'social dumping' refers to costs that are for their part depressed 
below a 'natural' level by means of 'social oppression' facilitating unfair pricing strategies 
against foreign competitors. Remedial action would either consist of the offending firms 
consenting to raise their prices accordingly or failing that, imposing equivalent import 
restrictions.113 
Excessive social dumping would be considered the solution and a relief since it would cut 
down important pressure for change in the company. With the dumping, companies intend to, and 
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sometimes are able to, ‘keep their profits high without structural, skill or technological advance’. In a 
short period, this could undermine a competitive economy and encourage inefficient organisation.114  
The continuous social dumping and race to the bottom between companies in the same 
sector, could lead to a downward spiral of development which would threaten not only the economy, 
with the already noticed competitive composition, but also ‘the positive values on which welfare states 
are based’.115 This race to the bottom of labour protections is one of the reasons for ‘organized 
labour’s objections to further trade liberalization’.116 Therefore it is important those trade unions and 
their movements (and with the help of society), adopt a principled attitude to social dumping in order 
to fight it on several levels. 
The ‘race to the bottom’ does not only affect and is not only unfair to the companies that do 
not engage into these practices, but it also has great repercussions on workers since it promotes a 
violation of their labour rights. For this reason, the inclusion of a ‘social clause’ into international trade 
agreements is proposed, to address this dangerous price competition which has been controversial, 
imposing minimum standards within the framework of liberalization of trade.117 A social clause is 
considered to be any rule, legally binding or not, that tends to set social protection minimums at 
international level, and may impose sanctions if any of the parties involved fail to follow them.118 
As accepted in the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, when 
talking about the responsibility that companies have in relation to respecting human rights, it refers 
to those that are internationally recognized. 119  These last are, at least, those human rights in 
international documents like the ones expressed in ILO’s Declaration and the International bill of 
Human Rights.120 
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  Stephen Joseph Powell and Trisha Low discuss an ongoing argument about the relationship 
of human rights, specifically labour rights, and international trade, where some human rights and 
labour lawyers argue that certain labour laws are essential to ‘human dignity’. The reaction of the 
WTO was to renew its commitment to ‘the observance of internationally recognized core labour 
standards’.121 Yet it was declared that the task of identifying the core labour standards corresponded 
to the ILO and not to the WTO.122 
 Labour rights may be divided into two: procedural and substantive rights. Substantive rights 
consist of rights regarding minimum wages, maximum limit for working hours, and health and safety 
regulations. In the other hand, procedural rights consist of, mainly, the right to collective bargain and 
union formation.123 
As previously described, the ILO’s Declaration establishes four categories for core standards 
through eight conventions. Some of these core standards fit into substantive rights, as well as the 
procedural rights. The ILO considers these standards to be universal and therefore applicable to all 
people and member countries, ‘regardless of the level of economic development’.124 Although ILO’s 
(1998) core labour standards are considered universal, they are taken into practice very differently 
across countries.125  
The countries with the highest income and economic situation are the ones who fulfil them 
the most. Even so, the causality between labour standards and economic growth is disputed. This 
means that the fact that better labour standards exist and are supported does not necessarily cause 
economic growth. 126 Strategies that rely on exports to have economic growth encourage developing 
countries to stop the process of improving labour standards. Following this idea, these developing 
countries opt for low labour standards through cheap labour (with child and/or forced labour) 
generating with it a competitive advantage over other countries that do meet labour standards, since 
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by having lower production costs, they can offer lower prices.127 This has been one of the biggest 
problems in trying to implement a social clause. 
According to Erika de Wet, most employers and developing countries’ governments consider 
a social clause as protectionism in disguise that would have the goal of cost equalization.128 Opposite 
and equally important, several industrialized countries like the United States, certain European 
countries, and some trade unions, among others, claim that this is not the case. They have defended 
that a labour or social dimension (clause) included in trade agreements would help globalization 
continue without causing any negative impact or at the costs of worker’s rights, on the contrary, it 
would help eradicate ‘the most flagrant violations of working’129 and enforce international labour 
standards.130  
The protectionist point of view contemplates that a social clause could have protectionist aims 
to prevent countries with low production costs from obtaining a competitive advantage that comes 
from their low wage costs. They believe this clause would push developing countries to artificially 
increase their production labour costs, ‘leading toward an increasing emphasis on capital intensive 
investments, an aggravation of the dualism of their economies, and a reduction of their employment 
growth-rate’.131 However, protectionism would be counterproductive because it does not save many 
jobs but it is an expensive process, and it is considered a devastating action for the economy. 
For the social clause to be effective, the type of labour standards is the aspect to take into 
consideration, not necessarily the number of norms included. That is, standards have to be accessible 
enough that there would be no need to force unaffordable standards onto countries.132 Considering 
this, the standards that are most often mentioned are those included in the ILO’s Work Declaration. 
Most of the Conventions that are included in the Declaration 1998 could be considered of having 
certain universality, ‘a necessary element of an international social clause’, given the fact that those 
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Conventions have been ratified by a great number of countries, and could therefore be used as 
minimum standards for the clause.133 Although declarations are not subject to ratification, they are 
intended to have a wide application and contain symbolic and political undertakings by the member 
States. 134  Moreover, the Declaration commits ILO Member States to protect these standards 
regardless of whether they have ratified the conventions.135 
Nonetheless, those who oppose the social clause may argue that because an international 
declaration with its conventions, that has had good recognition, is already handling labour rights, there 
is no necessity for the WTO to address them as well.136 Erika de Wet describes an answer with two 
aspects, the first being the Declaration and Conventions are subject to ‘moral pressure’, meaning the 
ILO does not impose economic sanctions or of any other kind that are not moral.137 Therefore, a 
clause in the WTO that does provide for sanctions, would ‘complement and strengthen the pressure’ 
of the Conventions.138Second, international labour standards should be considered much more than 
human rights issues that in consequence must be dealt by human rights instruments. These 
standards are also labour and trade matters, thus are ILO and WTO concerns and should cooperate 
in this regard.139 
Several laws have been passed, in different states, with the purpose of granting preferences 
to certain countries, considering for example the degree to which their workers enjoyed acceptable 
working conditions or not, the right to organize and collective bargaining, within others. This is not 
exactly a social clause, but it is a beginning towards the establishment of one. For instance, in Europe, 
the protection of labour rights is highly important, to the point that one of the requirements for 
membership in the Council of Europe is respect for core labour rights.140 The main focus will be on 
the Generalized System of Preferences.  
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The GSP gives market access on a preferential basis to developing countries. It has, as 
established by the European Commission, three main objectives. First, assist in the eradication of 
poverty by exporting more from developing countries. Second, ‘promote sustainable development 
and goods governance’, and third, guarantee that the EU’s economic and financial interests are 
protected.141 In addition, the European Union expects beneficiary countries to practice the United 
Nations human rights and the ILO conventions.142 It is crucial, for the promotion of core labour rights, 
that social initiatives are created under the GSP. 
Since the GSP adopted in 1994 was not as successful as it was thought it would be, in 2002 
a new GSP scheme entered into force. The special incentive arrangements were not giving the results 
that were predicted at the time of the creation in 1994, so the new scheme aimed to make these 
arrangements more attractive.143 The aim of the new GSP was to double the general preferences, 
but specifically in relationship to the definition of core labour standards, the new scheme made 
reference to the ILO’s 1998 Declaration. Therefore, those beneficiary countries that commit ‘serious 
and systematic’ violations could encounter the risk of losing their status.144 
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IV. NAFTA and Mexico 
a. Investment and commercial agreements, behaviour with labour 
law and standards  
 
The relationship between trade liberalization and human rights is something that has been in 
the international agenda, mainly by order of NGOs. Developing countries, when dealing with core 
labour rights, discuss that if they adhere to higher labour standards, they risk losing their competitive 
advantage.145  As an opposite argument, NGOs and some developed countries insist that trade 
liberalization is not a controversy that should take into consideration solely the economic aspects, but 
also, fundamental human rights, including core labour rights, should be taken into account, for they 
are deeply important.146 
Due to globalization, there has been an increase of emerging transnational corporations 
(TNCs) leading to competition in the international market where free movements of goods and cultural 
communication are significantly common and are becoming increasingly strong.147 Many of those 
TNCs seek to move their manufacturing factories offshore to some developing countries, such as 
India, Vietnam, China or Bangladesh, drawn by the much cheaper labour and less strict labour 
policies. This, in order to enjoy the cost advantage in global competition due to the gradually opening 
policies and the reduced transportation cost. This phenomenon leads to a ‘race to the bottom’, which 
means that countless TNCs pursue the maximum profits by hiring low-wage employees.148 
The relationship between trade and labour is undeniable. ‘Unfair labour practices’ can 
deteriorate free trade, which is opposite to the goal of free trade, as it was recognized by the WTO 
and ILO in the Work Declaration. Free trade incites all nations to produce those goods and services 
in which they have a ‘comparative advantage’, so that the production of those goods and services 
turns out to be efficiently. In this way free trade maximizes the wealth of all states. The comparative 
advantage can be due to external factor such as climate or natural resources, as well as internal 
factors like it being the result of accumulated expertise and investment.149 
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The human rights-based approach of the linkage between labour and trade perceives 
violations to the core labour standards, which were established by the ILO and the 1998 Declaration 
as fundamental human rights violations.150 By imposing a trade-labour linkage, nations are protecting 
those that are exploited in countries that infringe the core labour standards, including the protection 
of children that are forced into labour. When dealing with child labour, the human rights-based 
argument seems to have more importance, ‘particularly with regard to the worst forms of child 
labour’.151  
The prevailing controversy over the relationship between trade and labour rights, and the fact 
that there is no such thing as a global labour law (since it is considered ‘local, plain and simple’)152 
are reasons for which there are many and varied approaches to the issue of regulation. 153 
Consequently, each country adopts in a different manner the transnational labour regulations to which 
each State had committed.154 
Some countries and/or economically integrated regions have created provisions that 
unilaterally link their trade and investment policy with respect for minimum or internationally 
recognized labour rights. This kind of measure is often criticized because they do not derive from 
consensual obligations, from a negotiation between two or more countries, but are imposed 
unilaterally, usually by stronger industrialized countries on weaker countries who, in order to export 
products or services must assume the conditions imposed on them.155 
Likewise, it is frequently denounced that these measures are dictated by the most advanced 
countries with a hidden protectionist intention, disguised under an apparent concern for the social 
problems of third world countries. For some, the fact that the measures are accompanied by sanctions 
would confirm their protectionist purposes.156 The importing country is internally obliged to protect its 
own workers as a consequence of the increase in exports from countries that have a comparative 
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advantage of owning a cheaper labour force. That is why importing countries implement positive and 
negative measures: in the first case, providing a benefit to the country that complies by allowing 
access to its products and services to their local market, and in the second case, through the 
application of sanctions which include the loss or suspension of privileges or preferences, or even 
the prohibition of importing goods from that country.157 
 
b. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
 
In 1984, a concern to structure an international agreement between the North American 
countries (United States, Mexico and Canada) arose in the United States, due to the passing of the 
Trade and Tariff Act under President Ronald Reagan.158 Five years after the Trade and Tariff Act was 
passed, the United States and Canada consolidated their commercial relationship, entering into the 
Canada – U.S. Free Trade Agreement. It was the first North American agreement that dealt with free 
trade between two countries, aiming at the ‘elimination of barriers to trade in goods and services’.159 
Nonetheless, the Canada-U.S. Agreement got suspended in order to create a new treaty, this time 
including Mexico. The Presidents of the United States and Mexico George H.W. Bush (U.S.) and 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari respectively, with the Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signed the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the 17 of December 1992.160 But, it was until the 
1st of January 1994 that NAFTA entered into force.161  
According to NAFTA’s Article 102 there are six declared objectives for the treaty. These 
objectives were elaborated taking into consideration National Treatment and Most – Favoured Nation 
principle.162 They include:  
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, 
goods and services between the territories of the Parties;   (b) promote 
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conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; (c) increase substantially 
investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; (d) provide adequate 
and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each 
Party's territory; (e) create effective procedures for the implementation and 
application of this Agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution 
of disputes; and (f) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and 
multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this 
Agreement.163  
In simple words, NAFTA’s purpose was to stimulate economic growth and create an alliance 
between the North American countries. It was planned for it to encourage job growth, promote the 
three Parties’ economies, and increase imports.164 
NAFTA has fulfilled one of its initial purposes, increasing free trade between countries in the 
trilateral relationship.165 It is estimated that ‘trade among the NAFTA countries has tripled since the 
agreement’s signing’, therefore Mexican trade has been considerably expanded.166  
Despite this, NAFTA failed to address and provide provisions that focused on protecting 
labour and environmental rights, as most other trade agreements at the time of the creation of NAFTA 
failed to do as well. 167  To change this need, the member countries signed two cooperation 
agreements, one labour and the other environmental in order to ensure compliance with labour 
standards as environmental.168 The two parallel accords that where included as part of NAFTA were: 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and the North American Agreement 
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on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).169 For the purpose of this research, NAALC will be the 
agreement for study.  
 
c. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
 
As briefly mentioned before, the NAALC was incorporated into NAFTA at the last moment. 
170 This was due to the public concern towards NAFTA during President Bill Clinton’s campaign, 
regarding the absence of labour provisions.171 To deal with the public’s concern, the United States 
suggested the NAALC. It was also proposed in pursuance of NAFTA’s aim to protect and enforce 
labour rights, but the U.S. required, as a condition, for Mexico and Canada to comply with the 
proposed labour agreement.172 It was the first explicit incorporation of social rights into an FTA or 
Regional Integration Agreements (RIA), long before it was done in the Andean Community (CAN) 
and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), which are much older trade agreements.173 
Through NAALC, each of the three signatory countries committed to protect, improve and strengthen 
the basic rights of workers.174 
The NAALC makes the three North American countries commit on ‘subjects that go well 
beyond the Core Labour Standards (CLS)’, for instance: the right to strike (but not specifically union 
rights), equal pay for all men and women, social security protection and benefits regarding job 
accidents and illnesses, protection for immigrant workers, among others.175 The labour agreement 
prevented noncompliance with these standards or commitments through the imposition of fines. 
Amongst the first and most common controversies that have risen since the implementation of NAALC 
have been complaints filed by U.S. unions claiming violations of union organization rights from 
Mexican companies. 176  Another example was the accusation from a Mexican unions coalition, 
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supported by some American unions that accused ‘the Washington state apple industry of violating 
the rights of Mexican apple pickers and threatening their health and safety’.177 
Furthermore, certain authorities and agencies were established to be able to monitor 
compliance with what was agreed upon, as well as to lead with some controversy, if any, between 
the nations, their organizations or between corporations. This includes a Commission for Labor 
Cooperation, a dispute settlement mechanism and a National Administrative Offices in each of 
NAFTA’s countries.178 
Additionally, Annex 1 of the NAALC sets as labour principles, guidelines that the Parties 
agree to promote, under the conditions established by their respective national legislation. 179  
 
i. Principles 
 
The following principles only express general areas of concern that the Parties agreed upon, 
and where each Party has developed its own legal framework (laws, regulations, procedures and 
practices) to protect their respective workforce:180 
1. Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize 
2. The right to bargain collectively 
3. The right to strike 
4. Prohibition of forced labor 
5. Labor protections for children and young persons 
6. Minimum employment standards 
7. Elimination of employment discrimination 
8. Equal pay for women and men 
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses 
10. Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses 
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11. Protection of migrant workers181 
 
Primarily, the first three principles can fit into a general category of collective social rights. 
NAALC promotes the right workers have, without any obstacle, to form and/or join any organization 
they choose. The purpose of these groups would be to defend the workers’ common interests.182 
Following this, the protection of organized workers to freely intervening in collective bargaining, 
regarding their working conditions, and to strike to defend their collective interests is also sought.183 
Moreover, the Parties agreed on prohibiting and abolishing any type of forced labour, except 
for those that they (internally) consider as compulsory such as ‘military service, certain civic 
obligations, prison labour not for private purposes’, as well as any imposed work aimed at fighting 
emergencies. 184  They also agree on establishing restrictions to the employment of children, 
contemplating factors that could endanger the young persons in their physical, mental and moral 
development. Therefore, requirements include schooling and safety conditions.185 Complementing 
the previous information, Annex 1 contemplates in general the establishment of ‘minimum 
employment standards’. For instance, whether or not minimum wages and overtime pay for all wage 
earners without distinction belong to collective agreements.186  
Principles seven and eight focus mainly on the abolishment of employment discrimination 
and the respect for equal pay for men and women. Elimination of discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, sex, age, or other grounds, yet with some understandable exceptions like ‘bona fide 
occupational requirements…or rules governing retirement ages’, among others.187 With regards to 
equal pay, Annex 1 establishes the principle of equal pay for equal work to be applied.188  
Lastly, the final three principles focus on occupational injuries and illnesses, and migrant 
workers. The Parties should define and enforce standards and compensations to decrease 
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occupational injuries and illnesses, and if necessary, compensate workers or their dependants if an 
accident or fatality occurs within the workplace.189 With respect to migrant workers in a Party’s 
territory, provide them the same legal protection as if they were nationals from the Party, concerning 
working conditions.190 
The Parties agreed to form, each, a National Administrative Office (NAO) in order to 
guarantee the compliance with the eleven principles. The intention was for the Office to ‘serve as a 
point of contact between the national governments’.191 Each NAO has, between other functions, that 
of reviewing each country’s labour law and judge whether the Party has complied or not with the 
obligations with which it committed to under NAFTA.192 Additionally, each NAO has the power to bring 
complaints to NAALC’s Commission on Labor Cooperation.193 
 
ii. Three Levels of Protection 
 
Within the particular guidelines of the NAALC, mechanisms and procedures are provided for 
complaint processing and control that differ, in application, depending on the labour rights involved.194 
Depending on the complaint, the NAO offices can suggest three ways, three levels of protection, to 
address the issues.  
In the first level of protection, there is the already mentioned NAO that forms part of each 
Ministry or Secretary of Labour in each of the three countries.195 Its main function, complementing 
what was previously described, is to receive national complaints against another NAFTA member, 196 
which can request consultation with another NAO and may proceed to submit the matter to a 
ministerial review.197  This implies the obligation of the consulted government to respond to the 
consultant to clarify the problem posed.198  
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In the second protection level, if an issue has not been resolved through the aforementioned 
consultations, the matter is submitted to an evaluation by a Committee of Experts, also known as the 
Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE), created for this purpose. 199  The ECE is composed of 
persons who are outside NAALC’s mechanisms, and are selected from a list drawn up in consultation 
with the ILO and/or from a list drawn up by the Parties.200 The Committee is in charge of analysing, 
taking into account the Agreement objectives, ‘patterns of practice by each Party in the enforcement 
of its occupational safety and health or other technical labor standards’, and afterwards, formulating 
conclusions and recommendations on the issues in question. 201 
Finally, the last protection level has specific subjects that it is allowed to cover. It only deals 
with violations of rights connecting to child labour, minimum wages, and health and safety in the 
workplace.202 In addition to ministerial review and consultation or evaluation by an independent 
Committee of Experts (ECE), which the two previous levels settle, in case of non-compliance with the 
agreed action plans, the matters can be submitted to arbitration where an arbitration panel could 
order possible sanctions.203 In this process, it is the only case in which sanctions can be applied under 
the NAALC.204 
With respect to sanctions, under the Monetary Enforcement Assessment (Annex 39), they 
cannot be greater than twenty million dollars or ‘its equivalent in the currency of the Party complained 
against’.205 This money would go to a common fund intended to finance an action plan to improve the 
labour law enforcement and/or solve the lack of compliance with labour regulation the denounced 
country faces. 206  Another sanction would be the suspension of tariff benefits derived from the 
Agreement, meaning a commercial sanction. 207  The suspension would be, if the monetary 
contributions have not been paid, equivalent to this limited amount. Also, the complaining Party ‘may 
                                                        
199 NAALC 1994, (n 180) Art 23. 
200 Ibid Art 24; see also Marlon M. Meza-Salas (n 1) 761. 
201 Ibid Art 23. 
202 Ibid Art 27. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Meza-Salas (n 1) 761. 
205 NAALC 1994, (n 180) Annex 39. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Meza-Salas (n 1) 762. 
 41 
increase the rates of duty on originating goods of the Party complained against’.208 This possibility of 
tax collection is only applicable between the U.S. and Mexico.209 
Two important commitments of the NAALC should be noted: each Party should constantly 
strive to improve its labour laws so as to guarantee high labour standards, in relation to jobs with high 
quality and productivity coefficients210 and, on the other hand, to promote compliance with said 
legislation and ensure its effective application.211  
NAALC focused on the implementation of national labour laws and had an initial poor 
reception from major U.S. and Canadian unions.212 The disagreement was because NAALC did not 
provide a permanent central body to repair the breaches of obligations and sanctions only guaranteed 
with respect to the laws relating to child labour, health and safety at work and minimum wage, since 
only these principles were subject to an eventual arbitration panel.213 Collective rights issues, on the 
other hand, were only subject to ministerial consultations because deadlines contemplated in the 
agreement were very long. The Confederation of Mexican Workers (one of the most important 
Mexican unions), contrarily, did express its satisfaction for the Agreement and for the respect of 
national sovereignty.214 
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V. Influence of NAFTA on Mexican Law 
a. Labour law before NAFTA, during and after  
 
The Mexican Revolution 1910 caused the creation of a new Constitution in 1917 (“the 
Constitution”), which included articles that established and protected workers’ rights. 215  This 
Constitution is currently in force. It was one of the first Constitutions in the world to establish the right 
of labour to organize, strike, receive compensation for workplace accidents, as well as give details 
about workers’ rights. Therefore it would later on serve as a model for progressive constitutions 
around the world.216  
In general, Article 123 of the Constitution has included, since its origins in 1917, details about 
the protection of employees with respect to employment agreements, rights after termination, 
severance pay, wages, working hours, working ages and employee safety, within others. 217  In 
compliance with the rights of the workers detailed in the Constitution, the Mexican legislative branch 
established the first Federal Labour Law in 1931. 218  These laws that were enacted after the 
Revolution where ‘intended to be worker friendly’.219 
The laws must be amended according to the changes that arise in society, such as custom, 
economic conditions, industrial development, etc., in order to adapt this law to the prevailing needs.  
220 Following this, the Federal Labour Law of 1931 underwent various reforms and as a consequence 
the new Federal Labour Law of 1970 was created, which currently governs.221 
In 1994, as mentioned earlier, Mexico entered NAFTA, as well as NAALC. The NAALC’s 
main function is to help engage NAFTA countries to enforce their own labour laws, but the NAALC 
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does not require a change in the labour standards of the respective Party nor does it interfere with 
the labour laws of that country.222 
In the twenty-five years of the existence of NAFTA, there is controversy around how positive 
the effects of this trade agreement have been in Mexico. Official statements, given by the NAFTA’s 
parties, tend to analyse and view the agreement in a very positive way.223 The official reports do not 
give a ‘balanced consideration of NAFTA’s effects’; instead, they concentrate on NAFTA’s 
successes.224 Therefore, this study attempts to make a more unbiased analysis, concentrating on the 
more indirect effects, primarily the social and political effects of the trade agreement, specifically on 
Mexican labour law. Considering that NAFTA’s effect in this area (labour) is indirect, and because the 
agreement is still in force, conclusions will be made with caution. 
Although the Federal Labour Law is where the fundamental labour rights are written in, and 
Mexico has signed the majority of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) fundamental labour 
agreements, its application is perpetually weak.225 But, with NAFTA, the NAALC process provided a 
potential second phase of labour rights commitment in the three countries. Under the arbitration 
process of the labour agreement, any citizen or group can file a complaint with the National 
Administrative Office (NAO), offices that the FTA established in each state to administer the 
arbitration processes, as previously explained. 226  Transnational networks used the arbitration 
process as a potential area to be applied and to pressure Mexico into compliance with labour 
standards. Until 2015, about forty petitions had been submitted to NAALC, mostly against Mexico, 
and mainly before the U.S.’s NAO. Most cases have been delivered by NGOs, labour rights 
defenders, human rights groups and unions that led the movement to stop the trade agreement.227 
With regard to political changes, the effect of NAFTA has been positive given that the 
economic and social problems that Mexicans have had to face, since NAFTA came into effect, have 
resulted in a level of government response and responsibility that has rarely been seen in the history 
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of Mexico.228 Of all petitions, freedom of association emerged as the main complaint registered in 
most of the cases accepted by the NAO, twenty in total, but especially among those filed against 
Mexico.229 As part of some case resolutions, the governments of the United States and Mexico, and 
sometimes Canada, have agreed on detailed action plans to discuss those labour issues presented 
in the cases that come through the NAALC process. 230  Since 1995, the Mexican and U.S. 
governments have signed several agreements that reiterate their commitment to freedom of 
association. For instance, as part of the Sony case resolution, in 1996 for the Sprint case, in 1997 the 
SUTSP case, and in 2000 for the cases of ITAPSA and Han Young.231 
Specifically, the case of ITAPSA Company had a major impact on the development of 
Mexican labour regulation. As a result of this case, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (STPS 
for its acronym in Spanish) developed two websites for registering contracts: one allows public access 
to union registration documents, and the other is a database of collective contracts with information 
on who owns the negotiation rights within the individual factories and, in some cases, there is access 
to copies of the registration documents and statutes of each organization.232 
The result, after having received and resolved many cases on this issue, was improvements 
in the right of free association in Mexico. In addition to establishing the public registry of unions 
mentioned above, there was progress in the use of secret voting in union elections.233 Many cases, 
including Maxi-Switch (1996), Han Young (1997), and TAESA (1999), revealed that during the 
election of the directors of a union organization, workers were intimidated. This later became one of 
the main reasons why independent unions could not win the aforementioned elections.234 Citing the 
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1997 Ministerial Agreement and Mexico's stated intention to promote the secret vote, labour lawyers 
were able to achieve a commitment from the government to include freedom of association in any 
political agenda concerning a labour reform.235 While the issue of a national labour reform was not 
yet discussed, the Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Board in Mexico City (state CABs can function 
as tribunals and as the place where unions are registered, while at federal level the STPS registers 
unions and disputes are resolved at CABs)236 began to exercise the secret vote consistently after 
2002.237 Finally, the National Supreme Court of Justice declared, in 2008, that all union elections 
must be held by secret ballot. This electoral procedure is now a standard practice.238 
The NAALC process made the unequal treatment independent unions were facing 
indisputable, which caught the attention of the Local Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (CABs) 
officials.239 This caused the Mexican federal government to become more aware of the pressure 
emanating from the arbitration process, and started the way to democratize trade union regulation 
policies. 240  Occasionally, Mexican authorities went beyond the NAALC’s provisions to solve 
violations. For example, the officials demanded new union elections, or recognized the victories of 
the opposition even before the NAO hearings ended and issued its pronouncements.241 
The Maxi-Switch case is an example of the above. Workers who tried to form an independent 
union were denied registration at the local Sonora CAB. When the case reached NAALC and a public 
hearing was requested, the Mexican government intervened to resolve the complaint, and granted 
the registration to the independent union to avoid holding the public hearing.242 On April 16, two days 
before the public hearing was held, the U.S. NAO approved the request to withdraw the petition, given 
that the labour dispute had ‘concluded favourably’ with the recognition of the independent union.243 
In Kimberly Nolan’s opinion, these examples are considered exceptions since they had 
resolutions that are not representative of the NAALC cases as a whole, which often end in ministerial 
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consultations that fail to generate changes in labour policies or practices that improve working 
conditions in the local or national level.244 However, these resolutions are important as they show that 
the Mexican authorities were sensitive to the resolutions issued by the NAALC process, and they also 
implemented actions outside the official channels to resolve the cases245, showing that NAFTA has 
had impact on Mexican labour law and policies. 
Over time, and as these political dynamics were being extended throughout Mexico, labour 
advocates started to contribute to political dialogue and lobby for other important changes, even after 
NAALC’s process of revision had finished. An example of this is that in 1998, while NAALC reviewed 
a case on the use of pregnancy tests as part of the hiring of female workers in the maquiladora sector, 
this practice began to change in Mexico.246 Once the United States and Mexico began bilateral 
negotiations on the subject within the framework of the ministerial consultations, the Mexican 
government made public its commitment to eliminate gender discrimination, in line with the 
international agreements it has signed in this regard. 247 Afterwards, "Offices for special matters" were 
created under the STPS to investigate cases of child labour, women in the workforce and needs of 
workers with disabilities. An independent office was also created to address gender equality issues.248 
The pregnancy case supported the efforts and pressures of groups towards the government 
to ban the practice. During the following years, the Mexican government signed various agreements 
to end this procedure.249 Finally, in 2003, the Federal Prevention and Elimination of Discrimination 
Act entered into force, a law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. With this Act, the 
practice was forbidden, formally, for the first time.250 
Despite the fact that NAFTA, through its parallel agreement, NAALC, tried to put pressure on 
the Mexican government to promote, respect, and try to ensure compliance with labour rights, some 
precedents and laws were created, as previously established. Yet, there was no real change at 
constitutional level, nor in the most important labour law in the country, the Federal Labour Law (FLL). 
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Due to the debt crisis in the early eighties and the drastic adjustment suffered by Mexico, and 
then, with more force, following the signing of NAFTA, national governments promoted the easing of 
labour relations.251  For more than thirty years, despite the pressures of employers' groups and 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the law was not amended. 
But this was not an obstacle for the easiness and flexibility to be extended into the real life of 
companies and labour relations.252 To remedy this inconsistency, an important amendment to the FLL 
was carried out in 2012, which sought to legalize what was already a widespread practice, particularly 
in the so-called hourly wage and labour intermediation.253  
While it is true that one of the biggest amendments to the LFT came into effect in 2012, which 
implied the modification (either reform, addition or repeal) of more than three hundred articles, it is 
also true that these changes did not imply aspects that have been derived from the complaints made 
with support in the NAALC and through the NAO.254 That is, the modifications were not in reason and 
based on the recommendations of the NAO. Therefore, this reform has failed to bring the order to 
labour relations that NAALC expected.255 
 
b. Criticism towards NAFTA’s mechanisms 
 
General conclusions are difficult to make, ‘[o]ne cannot say that NAFTA has been 
unquestionably “good” or “bad” for Mexico’ for several reasons, according to Ranko Oliver.256 First, 
important developments of NAFTA can bring both favourable and unfavourable consequences.257 
Moreover, it is difficult to identify the changes caused specifically by NAFTA, where there was no 
influence from other factors. That is, it is impossible for any country to remain immune to changes 
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over the years, thus it becomes more complicated to isolate the effects of the agreement.258 Lastly, 
data, most of the time, is not completely reliable, especially in a country like Mexico where much of 
the workforce and economic sectors come from an informal economy.259 
As noticed, the NAALC, ‘as a labor side-agreement, was the first of its kind’.260 Even though 
it intended to ‘improve working conditions and living standards’ in the parties’ respective territories261, 
it did not specify as to how to meet this goal. Downey Moss establishes as an example that the 
agreement did not specify a minimum wage for the parties to submit to.262 Instead NAALC left it to 
each country to establish the minimum wage, as well as other labour standards, in their own domestic 
law.263 It generally specifies that ‘each Party shall ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide 
for high labor standards (…)’, 264 and ‘[e]ach Party shall promote compliance with and effectively 
enforce its labor law(…).265 Being so general, it did not give much guidance as to what each member 
had to do in order to satisfy NAALC. 
So, the agreement lacks specification as to how to improve labour conditions, it only mentions 
that each Party is responsible for ensuring that their labour laws and regulations were in compliance 
with high labour standards.266 Although the Mexican Constitution recognizes basic labour rights, the 
Mexican government has proven unable or unwilling to strictly enforce them all, coupled with the fact 
that there is in the NAALC no strict mechanism that implements or sanctions violations of labour 
rights. 267 In other words, NAFTA, with its complementary part NAALC, lacks sufficient enforcement 
mechanism. 
In a different manner, and complementing the statement that NAFTA cannot be described as 
completely good or bad, it is safe to say that, at least in Mexico, the experience with the NAALC 
agreement and processes within it changed the political dynamic.268 Because of the cases presented 
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to the NAO, the Mexican government could no longer ignore the national group efforts to get their 
attention and discuss their disagreements especially when, while reviewing the cases, the NAO 
legitimized both their complaints and their participation in the process. 269  That is, these groups 
became actors with political weight within Mexico. 
As can be seen from the previous section, since the NAALC process began, the Mexican 
government has made significant progress in the application of labour rights, in what Nolan 
(mentioned in Jesús Rubio’s research) describe as a spiral that goes from the outside to the inside.270 
That is, the Mexican government has found itself pressed by commitments within the framework of 
the NAFTA in the NAO, both by national groups and the United States and Canada.271 So, this parallel 
agreement created opportunities for transnational defence networks in Mexico to establish a path to 
improve the application of labour rights. 
As described above and as some Mexican cases show, improvements in some labour 
practices were made possible, in part, thanks to the work of transnational actors, who pressured 
Mexico (through NAALC) to make changes in this regard. At first they were superficial, but the 
consistent efforts during the NAALC process pushed the government towards deeper reforms and, 
in some cases, autonomous efforts272. However, the discussion about the labour rights situation in 
Mexico during the NAALC years analysed here, suggests that the country has not internalized, in it’s 
entirety, international labour rights standards or that its acceptance has been irregular in terms of 
practices that have improved (those that have been readily accepted), as well as in the different 
governance levels.273 
Finally, one of the main criticisms of the social agreements that are written into free trade 
agreements, such as NAALC, is that they are only as good as their enforcement mechanisms.274 The 
NAALC experience has led to changes in labour practices in Mexico, not so much at the legislative 
level, which could translate into greater protection for long-term Mexican workers. 
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Indeed, the NAFTA parallel agreement created opportunities for transnational defence 
networks to establish in Mexico a way to improve the application of labour rights, regardless of how 
strong or effective the agreement was per se, in terms of sanctioning compliance in a slighter 
manner.275 It is due to these side effects generated by international pressure that labour rights 
defenders can continue to seek labour rights protection through trade agreements as an additional 
way to improve compliance with those rights. 
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VI. The New Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) 
 
In the 2016 presidential campaign, the U.S. exit of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was a constant in President Trump's speeches. Despite opposition from various 
associations and even Congress, President Trump was close to announcing the U.S. withdrawal from 
the treaty.276 In this context, on May 18, 2017, the President of the United States publicly requested 
the renegotiation of the trade agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada. In August 
of that same year the negotiations began.277 
The negotiations that began in 2017, ended on September 30, 2018 when the U.S., Mexico and 
Canada reached an agreement to modify NAFTA. This was made official on November 30 of the 
same year at the Buenos Aires summit, where U.S. President Trump, Canadian Prime Minister 
Trudeau and Mexican President Peña Nieto signed the USMCA agreement (United States–Mexico–
Canada Agreement, also known as CUSMA in its Canadian version and as T-MEC in its Mexican 
version).278  
After this ceremony, three obstacles were presented to the USMCA, which were the ratification 
by the legislative power of each of the three countries.279 On June 2019, Mexico became the first 
country to ratify the new free trade agreement, when the Senate voted 114 to 4 in favour of it.280  
 
a. NAFTA vs USMCA 
 
While the USMCA follows the same objective as NAFTA, which is to reduce trade restrictions 
between the three countries by opening the markets and with it stimulate investment, it is also true 
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that the new agreement has some unique characteristics different to its predecessor. In general, and 
superficially, the differences can be seen through the division of chapters within them. NAFTA has 
twenty-two chapters while USMCA has thirty-four.281 Three chapters were eliminated from NAFTA 
dealing with: energy and basic petrochemicals, emergency action, and standards related measures 
(corresponding to technical barriers to trade).282 On the other hand, ten chapters were added to the 
new agreement, involving, among other topics: electronic commerce, labour, environment, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, anti-corruption, competitiveness, etc.283 The most important thing is to 
notice that this agreement deals with labour and environmental issues as part of it, not as parallel 
agreements as with NAFTA. 
As part of the new agreement, a chapter solely focused on labour issues was included into 
USMCA (chapter 23). It is said to include ‘more ambitious labour provisions than those established 
in the North American Labor Cooperation Agreement (NAALC)’284.285  
Some of the main provisions, somewhat different from NAALC, included in the chapter are 
the following: first, internationally recognized rights under each Party’s legislation should be 
implemented, and should consider ‘acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, 
hours of work, and occupational safety and health’.286Second, a commitment against the imports 
produced with forced or compulsory labour, or child labour, no matter if it was forced or compulsory.287 
Also, the first binding provision regarding resistance towards violence against workers when they 
exercise their rights.288 Another commitment to the protection of migrant workers and for the adoption 
of policies that contribute to the protection of workers due to discrimination in the workplace on the 
basis of sex.289 Furthermore, the incorporation of a public communications mechanism, available to 
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people from all Parties, concerning matters related to the application of these provisions.290 Lastly 
and most importantly for this study’s purpose, the commitment to ensure, in Mexican legislation, the 
effective implementation of the rights the workers have to freedom of association and to collective 
bargaining.291 This chapter would be submitted into the same dispute resolutions mechanisms that 
apply for the rest of the USMCA, unlike NAALC which had its own mechanisms.292  
 
b. Impact of USMCA on Mexican Labour Law 
 
Following the ratification of Mexico with respect to the USMCA, a reform of the Federal Labour 
Law (FLL) was made. This reform has been one of the most important changes in recent years that 
have been presented to the labour system. The Labour Reform published in the Federal Official 
Gazette on May 1, 2019, guarantees the implementation of article 123 of the Mexican Constitution, 
as well as the fulfilment of the commitments assumed by Mexico in the USMCA negotiations and in 
the framework of the International Labour Organization.293 
The approval of this amendment is part of the commitments acquired after the renegotiation 
of NAFTA.294 The labour chapter included an annex on the representation of workers in collective 
bargaining in Mexico, whereby the country pledged to undertake specific legislative actions to 
guarantee the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. Likewise, a part of Mexico’s 
commitments was to make it easier for workers to establish and join unions.295 
The U.S. House of Representatives had conditioned their ratification of the trade agreement 
in exchange for the Mexican Congress to first comply with the changes to the law, aligned with the 
settlement reached between the three countries in 2018.296 The U.S. demanded, within other things, 
the end of ‘protection’ labour contracts, which bind approximately three-quarters of the unionized 
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Mexican labour force.297 Therefore, to encourage the ratification of the United States, around 500 
articles of the FLL were amended, mostly related to strengthening democracy and accountability in 
trade unions and labour justice, as well as additional requirements that individual employment 
contracts must contain.298 
To understand the necessity for this reform, it is important to mention that for more than half 
a century, in Mexico, a group of ‘established, conservative (“charro”) unions’ have had very closed 
relationships with the government and the political party that ruled for most of the time, PRI.299 The 
leaders of these unions held their position for very long periods of time as consequence of the political 
support they gave. Also, ‘[l]abor boards made up of representatives of conservative unions, 
employers, and a pro-employer government made it extremely difficult for workers to form 
independent organizations’, supported by the fact that in many cases ‘charro’ unions and employers 
formed ‘protection contracts’.300 Generally, workers are not even aware that they are part of a union, 
since it is a common practice for a company union to sign a contract with the employer of a new plant 
before any workers are hired.301 And, when workers tried to organize independently in order to obtain 
better working conditions such as higher wages and benefits, these would be denied since they were 
already "represented" by a "protection" union.302 Therefore, demands for improvements of working 
conditions were never met and workers had to face greater obstacles in order to make their own 
union. 
Under USMCA this type of contracts are considered illegal. In compliance, the Mexican labour 
reform implies, among other things, the transition to effective union democracy, through the 
introduction of transparency in the election of union leaders and accountability on the activities of 
trade unions.303 Therefore, this eradicates the "protection contracts", signed without the consent of 
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the workers and, at the same time, guarantees an effective collective bargaining, in which the 
collective agreements and their revisions will be approved by the majority of the workers, to through 
a personal, free, direct and secret vote.304  
Lastly, the amendment also includes the establishment of an effective, transparent and 
independent labour justice system, through: ‘(a) the establishment of autonomous entities for labour 
conciliation, and (b) the transfer of functions from the Executive Power to the Judiciary, through the 
establishment of labour courts’.305 This changes the authority responsible for making decisions about 
labour conflicts from CABs to labour courts and new conciliation centres.  
 
c. Criticism towards it 
 
In Mexico there has been little opposition, in terms of the governing powers, to the new 
agreement, to the point that Congress and the Senate passed a reform bill to the FLL without 
hesitation, for the federal law to comply with USMCA.306 
However, there has been disagreement among the union leaders of the most important 
unions in the country. While the leaders of the ‘Confederación de Trabajadores de México’ 
(Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM) and the ‘Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana’ 
(Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers, CROM) threaten by saying that the new labour reform 
will "fragment" the labour movement, the leader of another important union, ‘Confederación 
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos’ (Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants, 
CROC), admitted that "times have changed" and that unions can no longer oppose free elections.307 
Some ‘progressive unions’, on the other hand, although they support the changes this reform 
establishes, they feel it doesn’t ‘go far enough’. They want to reverse some fundamental changes the 
2012 amendment of the FLL made in terms of allowing companies to outsource or subcontract jobs, 
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which had been previously banned.308 Despite the fact that the 2012 reform was not due to NAFTA 
(as mentioned in the previous chapter), these independent unions were expecting the new free trade 
agreement to deal with the outsourcing issue. These unions support the changes that the new 
agreement brought about in terms of collective rights of workers, but criticize that in terms of individual 
rights, workers' rights continue to be violated.  
So, there is a mix of ideas of what the new agreement, especially regarding labour, would 
bring as a result. But in the end, it is thought that the current reform will have a big impact: ‘charro’ 
unions will be democratized and more independent unions will emerge along with greater decision 
making power invested in them.309 Yet, it is safe to say that, as what happens with any fundamental 
change, new struggles will emerge.  
 
d. Is USMCA a step back or forward from NAFTA?  
 
First, it is important to notice that this agreement is expected to replace NAFTA in 2020, but 
in the meanwhile, NAFTA remains in force even though the USMCA is already ratified and having 
effects in Mexico.  
The USMCA addresses more recent and emerging issues such as e-commerce and 
intellectual property, so it can be said to be a modernized NAFTA. Also, the USMCA, different from 
NAFTA, has a labour chapter within the agreement, while NAFTA has a parallel agreement (NAALC) 
that deals with labour related issues. By including the labour provisions into the main trade 
agreement, it gives the impression that labour rights have the same level of importance as any other 
subject in the agreement.   
The new trade agreement has a very hard labour section, forcing Mexico (that is why the May 
reform happened) to have all its collective contracts opened, that is, there can no longer be 
“protection” contracts. Now, at least thirty per cent of the workers have to ratify the collective contract 
before the new conciliation centres; if it is not ratified, anyone can reject it.310 This is a central change 
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that NAFTA did not have but now the USMCA does. This is important because you force a real 
collective bargaining in Mexico and with that social dumping is fought. So, companies are forced to 
become competitive on salary issues, for example, by demanding it with the union, through collective 
bargaining. This means that now the free market, through the unions that workers choose, will be the 
ones setting labour standards such as wages. 
For example, the recently retired U.S. Congressman Sandy Levin and labour analyst Harely 
Shaiken when visiting Mexico, noticed the difference that independent unions will probably make, ‘by 
contrasting a Goodyear Tire plant where workers are paid about $1.50 per hour under a “protection” 
contract with the nearby Continental Tire plant where independent union workers made $ 6 per hour 
(with better benefits)’.311 
When judging the success of the new agreement, both from the Mexican and Canadian side, 
it is agreed that the results of the agreement should not be compared with the expectations that were 
had at the beginning of the negotiation, but rather with the alternative that seemed to be detached 
from the different gestures of the Trump Administration, that is, a trade war with the U.S. and, with it, 
the loss of market, of a favourable business climate as well as the loss of opportunities for growth 
and employment, that had cost so much to build in the past.312 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
‘Globalization’ is one of the main influences in our political, economic and social life, therefore 
making an impact in law and industrial relations. From the 1980's onwards, the globalization process 
has been accelerating due to great changes in the world as well as technological developments.313 
Markets have been opened, and gradually a greater and faster trade between companies in different 
countries has been promoted. As a consequence of this and the expansion of large multinational 
companies, an environment of greater competitiveness has been generated. This puts pressure on 
less advanced or localized companies in less developed countries to try to catch up with these large 
companies, subjecting themselves many times to 're-industrialization' processes.314 
Alongside these effects of globalization, many trade barriers have also been removed and 
trade liberalization has emerged, forcing States to sign and get involved into all types of commercial 
agreements, bilateral and multilateral, to make international commerce easier, specifically free trade 
agreements.315 The WTO is one of the main responsible bodies for the aforementioned international 
commercial agreements by regulating trade barriers and help liberalize trade in the process. However, 
in the last decades, due to globalization and the on-going evolution the WTO, international trade and 
investment law have gone through, human rights has become paramount in their respective trade 
agendas. There has been more international pressure to incorporate human rights into its trade 
agreements.  
It is necessary to 'attack' the adverse effects that globalization has brought and put 
globalization at the service of society and not at the service of specific interests of certain groups with 
economic or political power. Indeed, there have been collateral effects, specifically social, that have 
affected an essential part of commerce, which is labour. Trade agreements, especially free trade 
agreements, have placed greater emphasis on the rights of companies and have treated workers’ 
rights as residual, meaning that they are not always included in FTA’s, labour rights have been left 
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as the responsibility of national legislations.316 For these reasons it is considered a necessity to deal 
with the social dimension of international trade, especially in free trade agreements, to set a basis for 
national labour law. 
In order for the labor standards to be included in agreements at an international level, 
institutionalization must first be reached. There are two main institutions that should take responsibility 
with regards to the implementation of these clauses in international agreements: the WTO and the 
ILO. 
The fact that the WTO is the main authority in charge of the regulation of international trade, 
the importance of the ILO in the addition of a clause of this type should be taken for granted. The ILO 
could be of great help. However, for this to happen the ILO should establish the contents of such a 
clause by setting the rights at the labour standards that are considered universal. These include 
‘freedom of association and the right to strike, equality at the workplace, and protection against forced 
labor’.317  There have been, however, several critics towards the ILO. First, the broadness and 
diversity of the activities it manages has raised questions regarding the lack of focus on the workers’ 
essential human rights in a globalized economy. Secondly, the Labour Organization requires formal, 
effective mechanisms for dispute settlement and enforcement.318 
For Sergio López Bohle and Sebastián Ugarte Gómez ILO’s actions have been good in 
securing and developing core labour standards, yet they consider that the system could improve 
through cooperation of all social actors involved. 319 They give several recommendations in which the 
system could improve. First, they suggest to involve more actively employers and social actor for they 
can have influence in incorporating CLS into corporate codes of conduct. Secondly, address in 
national debate the matters involving international labour principles, for it is more probable to generate 
change if the public, social stakeholders and media are involve. Third, they consider the incorporation 
of a social clause in trade agreements as extremely important. But they recognize that this has been 
a topic that has arouse discussion, yet they acknowledge ‘humans and institutions need enforcement 
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through penalties to react upon non-compliant behaviours’. Additionally the WTO should take a bigger 
involvement, including social justice in their agreements. Fourth, improve the reach of ILO’s actions 
and methods regarding new forms of working like subcontracting, and finally also increase the 
coverage of the increasing informal sector workers.320 
In conclusion, the implementation of a social clause would need two steps: moral persuasion 
following ILO procedures, and afterwards an economic sanction by WTO contracting parties. Yet, for 
this to function, the parties have to be members of both, the ILO and WTO. If it were not the case, it 
would be more difficult for a social clause to be enforced through coordination between these 
Organizations because the procedures the ILO and WTO have can only be enforced towards their 
respective members.321 
Specifically, in North America, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered 
into force in 1994 , with the purpose to stimulate economic growth and create an alliance between 
the North American countries. It was planned for it to encourage job growth, promote the three Parties’ 
economies, and increase imports.322 A parallel accord was included to deal with labour issues: the 
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). Its principles only express general areas 
of concern that the Parties agreed upon, and where each Party has developed its own legal 
framework (laws, regulations, procedures and practices) to protect their respective workforce. As well 
it established three levels of protection to deal with complaints.  
In the twenty-five years of the existence of NAFTA, there is controversy around how positive 
the effects of this trade agreement have been in Mexico. Although the Federal Labour Law is where 
the fundamental labour rights are written in, and Mexico has signed the majority of the International 
Labour Organization’s (ILO) fundamental labour agreements, its application is perpetually weak.323 
But, with NAFTA, the NAALC process provided a potential second phase of labour rights commitment 
in the three countries. Until 2015, about forty petitions had been submitted to NAALC, mostly against 
Mexico, and mainly before the U.S.’s NAO. 
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With regard to political changes, the effect of NAFTA has been positive given that the 
economic and social problems that Mexicans have had to face, since NAFTA came into effect, have 
resulted in a level of government response and responsibility that has rarely been seen in the history 
of Mexico.324 Of all petitions, freedom of association emerged as the main complaint registered in 
most of the cases accepted by the NAO. 
The NAALC process made the unequal treatment independent unions were facing 
indisputable, which caught the attention of the Local Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (CABs) 
officials.325 This caused the Mexican federal government to become more aware of the pressure 
emanating from the arbitration process, and started the way to democratize trade union regulation 
policies. 326  Occasionally, Mexican authorities went beyond the NAALC’s provisions to solve 
violations. For example, the officials demanded new union elections, or recognized the victories of 
the opposition even before the NAO hearings ended and issued its pronouncements.327 
Despite the fact that NAFTA, through its parallel agreement, NAALC, tried to put pressure on 
the Mexican government to promote, respect, and try to ensure compliance with labour rights, some 
precedents and laws were created, as previously established. Yet, there was no real change at 
constitutional level, nor in the most important labour law in the country, the Federal Labour Law (FLL). 
While it is true that one of the biggest amendments to the LFT came into effect in 2012, these changes 
did not imply aspects that have been derived from the complaints made with support in the NAALC 
and through the NAO.328 
To complement, the agreement lacks specification as to how to improve labour conditions, it 
only mentions that each Party is responsible for ensuring that their labour laws and regulations were 
in compliance with high labour standards.329 Although the Mexican Constitution recognizes basic 
labour rights, the Mexican government has proven unable or unwilling to strictly enforce them all, 
coupled with the fact that there is in the NAALC no strict mechanism that implements or sanctions 
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violations of labour rights. 330 In other words, NAFTA, with its complementary part NAALC, lacks 
sufficient enforcement mechanism. Yet, the Mexican government has found itself pressed by 
commitments within the framework of the NAFTA in the NAO, both by national groups and the United 
States and Canada.331 So, this parallel agreement created opportunities for transnational defence 
networks in Mexico to establish a path to improve the application of labour rights. 
On the other hand, in late 2018 the three NAFTA Parties signed a new trade agreement, 
USMCA, which only Mexico has ratified (at the beginning of 2019). Following the ratification of Mexico 
with respect to the USMCA, a reform of the Federal Labour Law (FLL) was made. This reform has 
been one of the most important changes in recent years that have been presented to the labour 
system.  
Under USMCA ‘protection’ contracts are considered illegal. In compliance, the Mexican 
labour reform implies, among other things, the transition to effective union democracy, through the 
introduction of transparency in the election of union leaders and accountability on the activities of 
trade unions. 332  With this, it eradicates the "protection contracts", and guarantees an effective 
collective bargaining, in which the collective agreements and their revisions will be approved by the 
majority of the workers, to through a personal, free, direct and secret vote.333 
There is a mix of ideas of what the new agreement, especially regarding labour, would bring 
as a result. But in the end, it is thought that the current reform will have a big impact: ‘charro’ unions 
will be democratized and more independent unions will emerge along with greater decision making 
power invested in them.334 Yet, it is safe to say that, as what happens with any fundamental change, 
new struggles will emerge. 
In conclusion, free trade agreements, specifically NAFTA has had little impact on Mexican 
labour law, yet the new trade agreement, USMCA, with only a few months that Mexico has ratified it, 
has already had a very transcendental impact in federal labour law. It has been a positive 
development from NAFTA to this new agreement where crucial changes are starting to take place. 
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However, it is important to notice that the future of both agreements and the commercial relationship 
between the North American Parties is still uncertain.  
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